Introduction
The argument whether China’s model of economic development is unique or similar to the rest of the world, especially when compared with the West, has existed for quite a while. In the sheer relentless quest towards understanding why some nations become rich while others fail, the case of China might represent an exception to the conventional wisdom and the most celebrated model of economic development currently in use. Alternatively, the deeper inspection of this case might help generalise our understanding of economic development in such a way that it allows us to explain China’s trajectory as well. As a major milestone, the publication of Kenneth Pomeranz’s book The Great Divergence in 2000 sparked a new era in global comparative economic history and added a new page to the debate on the question of Chinese or European uniqueness. It would be practically impossible, as well as superfluous, to summarise or even mention all the publications that contributed to this debate in the last 20 years.
In most of the existing review articles, it is stated that England was the “lucky one” and China the “normal”.(1) The idea of European exceptionalism was not only argued by specialists in European history, but also voiced by some authors from Asia.(2) In all of these publications a lot of attention was devoted to the question of timing: when did Europe surpass the Chinese economic development?Was this around 1800, when England entered a phase of continuous modern industrial economic growth, as argued by Pomeranz, or was it earlier, in the mid-18th century, or late-17th century when states in Europe commenced to modernise their institutions and technologies? Of course this strand of the debate was highly connected to the one about explanations. The dominant view here among economic historians followed the lines of Pomeranz, that is, geography, culture, and institutions all played at the background, but the technological changes and the effects of transatlantic globalisation were seen as decisive. Currently, this is the standard view for many scholars.(3)
However there exists a second line of reasoning that includes more institutional arguments. This line of explanation starts off at the views of Douglass North on transaction costs and the prominent role of institutions, including the prevailing systems of written and unwritten laws and the role of the state.(4) Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson have built upon these arguments. In their seminal article “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development” from the year 2001, they argued that the quality of economic institutions was the key longterm determinant of economic growth.(5) In their view good economic institutions protected property and contract rights, which means the development of private entrepreneurship and investment. In another book (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, the authors go one-step further in arguing that economic institutions in turn are determined by politics.(6) Here, they concentrate less on the role of the state, but rather on questions of representation and inclusion of different classes of people in the state. Their argument is that the more concentrated the political power is, the more a small group in society tries to extract wealth for itself without investing in public goods or the wider well-being. Acemoglu and Robinson’s answer to the question on what explains the differences in wealth across the world is in short: representative and inclusive political institutions.
A third and broader line of reasoning also starts with North’s institutional-ist arguments, but focuses more on state formation, models of tax-extraction, in combination with empire-building and the broader economic development. Peer Vries made an important and well-received contribution to this approach: the role of the state and state-making in fostering economic growth. In his opinion it was the state that acted as the prime mover in the economic development of China and Britain. According to him the Chinese tax-extraction in combination with,what he calls, agrarian paternalist policies did not spark the same development as in Britain. In his seminal book State, Economy and the Great Divergence:Great Britain and China, 1680s-1850s from 2015, Peer Vries makes valuable observations on the Chinese development.(7)
However, because this book relies largely on second-hand literature, the persuasive quality of some of the arguments is hindered. It stands to reason that primary sources allow for a higher level of detail and accuracy. Here are some examples. Vries states on page 91:
“Whereas ‘up to the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion in 1851 the state had always made the examination system the primary, and the sale of offices secondary, channel of mobility’, it by and large was the other way around after that rebellion. During that rebellion selling offices yielded 4 to 6 million taels of silver annually. For the period we discuss in this book, it seems safe to conclude that Wang’s first type of contributions, in total, apparently did not yield more than, on average, a couple of million taels of silver per year. That is substantial, but not so much as to fundamentally change orders of magnitude of total government income.”
In this statement, Peer Vries refers to four sources. Two do interest us here now. In note 97 on this page Peer Vries refers to K. W. Swart.(8) This study mentions the 4-6 million taels of silver income from the selling of offices. As its source the author of this study refers to the observations of an American missionary published in 1849 in the Chinese Repository. Vries verifies the number of taels, using Ma Debin LSE Working Paper, “Rock, scissors, paper: the problem of incentives and information in traditional Chinese state and the origin of the Great Divergence” from 2011. More specifically Vries refers to graph 4 on page 25, where he thinks the 4-6 million taels of silver is confirmed. Actually,this graph shows that the income from the sales of offices between 1800 and 1863 reached just above the 1 million taels of silver for three separate years. Ma Debin refers to these data on revenue to the very reliable source in Luo Yu-dong,History of Chinese Likin Tax.(9) So this does not confirm Swart his statement from the 1949 dissertation. Swart’s book is based on a much less reliable source.While Vries’s conclusion remains prudent but even “a couple of millions taels”is too much. In my opinion it was impossible for the government to gain such an amount of money from selling offices. In fact, even the court reduced the requirements of selling offices after the rebellion, it failed to achieve good results because the rich had lost confidence towards the court. In 1851, selling offices only yielded 1,110,385 taels, and in 1853, the amount dropped to 672,611 taels.(10)It never reached to 4-6 million taels of silver annually during the rebellion. The second problem is that even in the late Qing period, the examination system was still the principal way to select for offices. As an illustration of its importance,Zuo Zongtang, one of the highest officers originating from the ranks of the military, was appointed by the imperial government as the supreme military commander of Xinjiang province to fight against the rebellion led by Mohammad Yaqub Beg and supported by Russian troops. During this war, even he asked to return to Beijing to take the imperial examination.
On pages 94 and 95 Vries states:
“By far the most important tax, the one on land, remained almost stable for the entire period of Qing rule that we are discussing here. It basically only increased somewhat with the extension of cultivated land. I did not find any estimate for the period till the First Opium War that was higher than 50 million taels. The yield of the rest of official taxes was and continued to be much smaller.”
This sentence is a little vague and it contains a rough estimate of the land tax-revenue. The 50 million is not just the land tax of the Qing Dynasty in the 19th century. The total revenue of the Qing Dynasty before the First Opium War(1840-1842) rarely exceeded 50 million taels of silver, even surcharge added.As will be discussed later in this book, the total revenue at that time included land tax (about 20-25 million taels of silver), salt tax (about 5 million), customs duties (about 5 million), selling of offices (about 2 million) and miscellaneous taxes (about 1 million).
On page 152 Vries quotes:
“The regular income of officeholders totaled only 6,295,000 taels,while the extra income totaled about nineteen times as much as the regular income. The combined total income of gentry members from office holding was an estimated 121,000,000 taels of silver annually. This large sum was shared by some 23,000 incumbent Chinese officeholders, who constituted about 1.6% of the total gentry ranks in the late nineteenth century. On the average, the gross income of an officeholder amounted to more than 5,000 taels of silver per annum.”
Actually, this sentence was cited from Chung-Li Chang’s dissertation(11).However, this description is not supported by source material. There are no “personal income” statistics available for this period. This problem with Chang’s work was also observed in the 1963 review of the book American Anthropologist by Robert M. Mars.(12)
The main aim of this book is to reflect on the Chinese development and the role of the state and its institutions in a broader understanding. Its specific focus is a fiscal one. The main contribution to the debate on Chinese economic performance builds on fiscal data. To answer the question of China’s or England’s uniqueness in their economic development models, my focus is very much on the role of the Chinese state, on fiscal development, and on to what extent the government or administration intervened in society. The analysis of fiscal data is at the heart of this book. But to build my argument an understanding is required of the fiscal regime, its options and alternatives regarding the two pillars of any society: the demographic composition and development and the structure and de-velopment of the Chinese economy. In addition to this, a chapter has been added on the Chinese state and its willingness to intervene in specific conditions. These arguments combined will hopefully form a reply to Peer Vries’s statements on the paternalist Chinese interventionist state.
Another disclaimer, this book will not offer a comparative analysis, although there will be references to literature on Europe occasionally. This book presents specific knowledge of Chinese history based on Chinese sources. My case study is the Qing Dynasty, 1644-1911.
The Chinese society has a long and continuous development, and can be seen as one of the oldest and most enduring traditions and civilisations in the world. Importantly, this continuity is the result of state formation, and the role of Chinese institutions. In this sense, when compared with the West with its many rising and vanishing civilisations, China could be regarded as special, as its continuity bridges millennia. The question remains about how the state and economy in China were interrelated. That is the main lens for my research. I am convinced that when conducting research on China’s political affairs, one needs to consider economic factors and vice versa, since these two aspects are closely intertwined in the social fabric of a country.
To understand the characteristics of economic development in the Qing Dynasty, this study examines some of the relevant aspects of the economy, which include population development and the way this issue was discussed in China,the production and composition of the total trade value in parts of China, the fiscal transformation that happened during the Qing period, the failure practice of borrowing money by the government, with specific attention to disaster relief as an indicator of resilience and state response in this period. I focus on these aspects to analyse the existing literature, the most relevant data, and to clarify the type or model of economic development in Imperial China and how the state acted accordingly.
In compiling this book, I have drawn materials from three main unpublished series of sources.(13) I like to start with the most relevant, which are the First Historical Archives of China (Beijing), including:
—Zhupi Zouzhe (Palace Midrange Rescript Memorials), for which the archive accession numbers always begin with the numeral 04, for example,04-01-35-0326-043. Archive accession numbers give complete information about the archived item. The here-mentioned example indicates that the item belongs to Zhupi Zouzhe and refers to a report submitted by Gao Chen, a Shanhai Guan district officer, on December 22, 1750 (Chinese lunar calendar).(14)
—Tiben (Reports to Emperors), whose archive accession numbers always begin with 02, for example 02-01-04-14795-017. Archive accession numbers give complete information about the archived item. The example given refers to an item belonging to Tiben and identifies a report submitted by Jiangfu, a minister of the Ministry of Revenue, on May 10, 1754(Chinese lunar calendar).
—Lufu Zouzhe (Extra Copies of Grand Council Memorials), whose archive accession numbers always begin with 03, for example 03-604-040. Archive accession numbers always give complete information about the archived item. The example refers to an item belonging to Lufu Zouzhe and identifies a report submitted by Chang Fu, a Shanhai Guan district officer, on November 12, 1789 (Chinese lunar calendar).
—Shangyu Dang (Edict Records), the emperors’ orders; when cited in this book these are followed by the date of issuance, as given in the archive.
To save space and facilitate ease of use, when I cite Zhupi Zouzhe, Tiben,or Lufu Zouzhe I only give the archive accession numbers of items, which could be traced back through the reporter’s name and the date on which the report was submitted.
The second major source is a selection made from a variety of published records, by the First Historical Archives of China and the Palace Museum of Taipei and includes the following:
—Gong Zhong Dang Kang Xi Chao Zou Zhe (Palace Midrange Rescript Memorials of the Kangxi reign).
—Gong Zhong Dang Guang Xu Chao Zou Zhe (Palace Midrange Rescript Memorials of the Guangxu reign).
—Gong Zhong Dang Qian Long Chao Zou Zhe (Palace Midrange Rescript Memorials of the Qianlong reign).
—Gong Zhong Dang Yong Zheng Chao Zou Zhe (Palace Midrange Rescript Memorials of the Yongzheng reign).
—Guang Xu Chao Zhu Pi Zou Zhe (Palace Midrange Rescript Memorials of the Guangxu reign).
—Guang Xu Xuan Tong Liang Chao Shang Yu Dang (Edict Records of the Guangxu and Xuantong reigns).
—Jia Qing Dao Guang Liang Chao Shang Yu Dang (Edict Records of the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns).
—Kang Xi Chao Man Wen Zhu Pi Zou Zhe Quan Yi (Translation of the Palace Midrange Rescript Memorials recorded in the Manchu language of the Kangxi reign).
—Kang Xi Chao Han Wen Zhu Pi Zou Zhe Hui Bian (Collection of the Palace Midrange Rescript Memorials recorded in the Han language of the Kangxi reign).
—Qian Long Chao Shang Yu Dang (Edict Records of the Qianlong reign).
—Xian Feng Tong Zhi Liang Chao Shang Yu Dang (Edict Records of the Xianfeng and Tongzhi reigns).
—Yong Zheng Chao Man Wen Zhu Pi Zou Zhe Quan Yi (Translation of the Palace Midrange Rescript Memorials recorded in the Manchu language of the Yongzheng reign).
The first and second sources are the archives and the first-hand materials,which are the cornerstone of this book. The third and last source is the Chaodang(Copies of the Archives), which is stored in the library of the Institute of Economics, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. As some archives have been lost throughout the centuries, sometimes I have had to rely solely on the Chaodang as a data source. However, as a rule I give priority to inspecting archives firsthand (rather than copies), and I only cite the Chaodang instead if I can not find the original archive entry or if data was missing in that archive.
Needless to say, in addition to archives, there are many kinds of official books, gazetteers, and other historical records (such as published collections written by individual officials) that also became relevant in my research. I provide details of these sources when they are cited. These are the building blocks that I use, in combination with the existing and growing scholarship on Chinese economic history. I also will refer to recent publications of Chinese scholars available in Chinese.
There have been a multitude of important debates on Chinese economic history. However, in this book I had to limit myself to only discussing a few aspects. Firstly, this book aims to describe and contextualise the population expansion of Qing China, analyses the solutions employed, and tries to establish whether or not Malthusian principles had been independently developed in China at about the same time as in the West. Secondly, by accessing first-hand archival materials, this book tries to estimate the total trade value of goods in the early-19th century Qing Dynasty, and thereupon compare the role of the trade sector in the economic development of different countries. Thirdly, this book focuses on the fiscal system. In doing so it shows how the Qing court could be typified as traditional and conservative, as no single entity had the power to challenge the natural progression of events. Fourthly, this book tries to analyse the difference between the Qing and the West about the practices of borrowing money, from which we could understand the great difference. The last element is a case study detailing a big flood in 1823. This aims to verify whether Beijing spent a much higher share on disaster relief in comparison with the disaster responses of major European nations during severe crises in the 19th century. In this way, my book tries to answer the central question, that is, whether the Chinese economic development can be considered unique or similar to the West.
(1) Peter C. Perdue. Review of Pomeranz, Kenneth, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy. H-World, H-Net Reviews. August, 2000. URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4476.
(2) Prasannan Parthasarathi. Review of The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy by Kenneth Pomeranz. Past & Present, no.176 (Aug., 2002), pp.275-293.
(3) Robert C. Allen (2011). Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(4) Douglass C. North (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
(5) D. Acemoglu et al. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development. American Economic Review,vol.91, no.5 (Dec., 2001), pp.1369-1401.
(6) D. Acemoglu and J.A. Robinson (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. New York: Crown Publishing Group-A Division of Random House, Inc.
(7) P. Vries (2015). State, Economy and the Great Divergence: Great Britain and China,1680s-1850s.London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
(8) K.W. Swart (1949). Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p.110.
(9) Luo Yudong. History of Chinese Likin Tax (中国厘金史). Shanghai: Commercial Press. 1936/2010,pp.6-7.
(10) Luo Yudong. Zhongguo Lijin Shi (1936). p.7.
(11) Chung-Li Chang: The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth Century Chinese Society.Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1955, p.42.
(12) Robert M. Mars (1963). Bookreview on page 963 and 964 in the American Anthropologist 65.
(13) As my book Ni, Y. (2016). Customs Duties in the Qing Dynasty, ca. 1644-1911. indicated, there were only few scholars who used first-hand archives to analyse these topics. An absence of archival material will create a blind spot within the field of research. For example, with the exception of Tang and myself about the customs duties, most researchers have drawn their data from two sources: Shi Qu Yu Ji (SQYJ)by Wang Qingyun; and The List of Money and Grains Sent to and from the Provinces in the Seventeenth Year of Jiaqing in the Qing Dynasty. I have shown, however, that these sources are unreliable because customs data are missing for many historical periods and major ports of entry(on land borders or domestic waterways, and along the eastern coast). By inspecting archives from the First Historical Archives of China, I found that data in SQYJ for Chongwenmen, Zuoyi, Youyi,Nanxin Guan and Zhehai Guan are inaccurate for the years 1841, 1842, 1845 and 1849, while the data in LMGS for Zhangjiakou, Shanhai Guan, Shahukou, Chongwenmen, Huai’an Guan, Xushu Guan,Yangzhou Guan, Xixin Guan, Jiujiang Guan, Longjiang Guan and Beixin Guan are inaccurate for the years 1811 and 1812. When customs data from the above mentioned less reliable data points are added, the data in LMGS is higher by more than 200,000 taels of silver per year and higher in SQYJ by more than 1,000,000 taels of silver (Ni Yuping, 2008 A & B.)
(14) Generally, the Governor and Viceroy would report every important affair to the Emperor and the Emperor would write some comments on the report with a red pen. The words in the report will be written in print style and can be easily seen. Zhupi means it was commented on by the Emperor with a red pen. So Zhupi Zouzhe (Palace Midrange Rescript Memorials) was the original report. In order to keep the record, the court had all the copies of the Zhupi Zouzhe, which bore the name of Lufu Zouzhe (Extra Copies of Grand Council Memorials). Tiben (Reports to Emperors) also was one kind of official’s reports to the Emperors.