CHAPTER Ⅶ JAPAN'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND THE CHINESE BOYCOTT/1 /1
Chinese boycott of Japanese goods an important factor in Sino-Japanese struggle.
The three preceding chapters have been chiefly confined to a description of military and political events since September 18th, 1931．No survey of the Sino-Japanese conflict would be accurate or complete without some account of another important factor in the struggle, namely the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods．To understand the methods employed in this boycott movement and their effect on Japanese trade, some indication must be given of the general economic position of Japan, of her economic and financial interests in China, and of the foreign trade of China．This is also necessary to understand the extent and character of the economic interests of both China and Japan in Manchuria, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Japan's over-population.
During the Meiji Restoration period in the sixties of the last century, Japan emerged from her isolation of over two centuries, and within less than fifty years developed into a world power of the first rank．A population formerly almost stationary started to grow rapidly from 33,000,000 in 1872 until it reached a figure of 65,000,000 in 1930; and this tremendous growth still continues at the rate of about 900,000 per year.
The population of Japan compared with its total surface is approximately 437 persons per square mile, as against about 41 in the United States, 330 in Germany, 349 in Italy, 468 in Great Britain, 670 in Belgium and 254 in China.
Comparing the population of Japan per square mile of arable land with that of other countries, the ratio for Japan is exceptionally high, due to the particular geographical formation of the Island Empire:
Japan………………2,774
Great Britain………2,170
Belgium……………1,709
Italy………………819
Germany……………806
France………………467
United States of America………………229
Due to a highly concentrated population on agricultural land, the individual holdings are exceedingly small, 35% of the farmers tilling less than one acre and 34% less than two and one half acres．The expansion limit of tillable land has been reached, as has also the limit of cultivation intensity—in short, the soil of Japan cannot be expected to produce much more than it does today, nor can it provide much additional employment.
Agrarian difficulties.
Moreover, as a result of intensive cultivation and the widespread use of fertilisers the cost of production is high.
The price of land is far higher than in any other part of Asia, and even in the most overcrowded parts of Europe．Much discontent seems to exist amongst the heavily indebted population, and conflicts between tenants and landowners are on the increase．Emigration has been considered a possible remedy, but for reasons dealt with in the next chapter it has not, up to the present time, proved to be a solution.
Japan at first turned to industrialism to foster the growth of an urban population which would both provide a home market for agricultural products and turn labour to the production of goods for domestic and foreign use．Several changes have occurred since that time．Where, formerly, Japan was more than self-sufficing from the point of view of good supply, of recent years from 8% to 15% of its total imports have been foodstuffs, the fluctuation being due to the varying conditions of the home crops, principally rice．The importation of foodstuffs, and the probable increasing need of these imports necessitate an attempt to offset the country's already unfavourable trade balance by an increase in exports of industrial products.
Need for further industrialization.
If Japan is to find employment for her increasing population through the process of further industrialisation the development of her export trade and of foreign markets capable of absorbing an increasing amount of her manufactured and semi-manufactured goods becomes more and more essential．Such markets would, at the same time, serve as a source of supply of raw materials and of foodstuffs.
China a market for Japanese export trade.
Japanese export trade, as hitherto developed, has two main directions: her luxury product, raw silk, goes to the United States; and her staple manufactures, chiefly cotton textiles, go to the countries of Asia, the United States taking 42.5% of her exports and the Asia market as a whole taking 42.6%．Of this latter trade China, the Kwantung Leased Territory, and Hong Kong take 24.7%, and a large share of the remainder is handled by Chinese merchants in other parts of Asia./1
During 1930, the last year for which complete figures are available, the total exports of Japan amounted to 1,469,852,000 Yen, and her imports to 1,546,071,000 Yen．Of the exports, Yen 260,826,000 or 17.7%, went to China（excluding the Kwantung Leased Territory and Hong Kong）, while of the imports 161,667,000 Yen, or 10.4%, came from China（excluding the Kwantung Leased Territory and Hong Kong）.
Analysing the principal commodities exported by Japan to China, it will be found that China takes 32.8% of all aquatic products exported by Japan; 84.6% or refined sugar; 75.1% of coal, and 31.9%, of cotton tissues, or an average of 51.6%.
The same analysis applied to the commodities imported from China shows that 24.5% of the total amount of beans and peas imported by Japan comes from China; 53% of the oil cake; and 25% of vegetable fibres; or an average of 34.5%.
As these figures are for China only, excluding Hong Kong and the Kwantung Leased Territory, they do not indicate the extent of Japanese trade with Manchuria, which passes mainly through the port of Dairen.
Importance of Sino-Japanese trade relations.
The facts and figures just given clearly show the importance to Japan of her trade with China．Nor is Japan's interest in China limited to trade alone; she has a considerable amount of capital invested in industrial enterprises, as well as in railways, shipping and banking, and in all of these branches of financial and economic activity the general trend of development has been increasing considerably during the last three decades.
Japanese investments in China.
In 1898 the only Japanese investment of any consequence was a small cotton gin in Shanghai owned jointly with Chinese, representing a value of about 100,000 taels．By 1913 the estimated total of Japanese investments in China and Manchuria amounted to 435,000,000 Yen, out of a total of Yen 535,000,000 estimated investments abroad．By the end of the World War, Japan had more than doubled her investments in China and Manchuria over those of 1913, a considerable part of this increase being due to the famous “Nishihara loans,” which had been partially granted for political considerations．Notwithstanding this setback, Japan's investments in China and Manchuria/1 in 1929 were estimated at almost 2,000,000,000 Yen/1 out of her total investments abroad of 2,100,000,000 Yen, showing that Japan's China and Manchuria, the latter having absorbed by far the greater part of this investment（particularly in railways）.
Apart from these investments, China has been indebted to Japan for various state, provincial and municipal loans which in 1925 were estimated at a total of 304,458,000 Yen（the greater part unsecured）， plus 18,037,000 Yen interest.
Although the bulk of Japan's investments are in Manchuria, a considerable amount is invested in industries, shipping and banking in China proper．Nearly 50 per cent of the total number of spindles operated in the spinning and weaving industry in China in 1929 were owned by Japanese．Japan was second in the carrying trade of China, and the number of Japanese banks in China in 1932 is put at thirty, a few of which are joint Sino-Japanese enterprises.
China's interest in the development of trade with Japan.
Although the foregoing figures are stated from the standpoint of Japan, it is easy to see their relative importance from the standpoint of China．Foreign trade with Japan has held first place in the total foreign trade of China up to 1932．In 1930, 24.1% of her exports went to Japan, while in the same year 24.9% of her imports came from Japan．This, in comparison with the figures from Japan's standpoint, shows that the trade of China with Japan is a greater percentage of her total foreign trade than is the trade of Japan with China of the total foreign trade of Japan．But China has no investments, banking or shipping interests in Japan．China requires, above all else, to be able to export her products in increasing quantities to enable her to pay for the many finished products she needs and in order to establish a sound basis of credit on which to borrow the capital required for further development.
Sino-Japanese economic and financial relations easily affected by many disturbing factor.
From the foregoing, it is evident that Sino-Japanese economic and financial relations are both extensive and varied, and, consequently, easily affected and disorganised by any disturbing factor．It also appears that, in its entirety, Japanese dependence on China is greater than China's dependence on Japan．Hence Japan is the more vulnerable and has more to lose in case of disturbed relations.
It is therefore clear that the many political disputes which have arisen between the two countries since the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 have in turn affected their mutual economic relations, and the fact that in spite of these disturbances the trade between them has continued to increase proves that there is an underlying economic tie that no political antagonism has been able to sever.
Origin of boycott.
For centuries the Chinese have been familiar with boycott methods in the organisation of their merchants, bankers, and craft guilds．These guilds, although they are being modified to meet modern conditions, still exist in large numbers and exercise great power over their members in the defence of their common professional interest．The training and attitude acquired in the course of this century old guild life has been combined, in the present-day boycott movement, with the recent fervent nationalism, of which the Kuomintang is the organised expression.
Modern anti-foreign boycotts.
The era of modern anti-foreign boycotts employed on a national basis as a political weapon against a foreign power（as distinct from a professional instrument used by Chinese traders against each other）can be said to have started in 1905 with a boycott directed against the United States because of a stipulation in the Sino-American Commercial Treaty, as renewed and revised in that year, restricting more severely than before the entry of Chinese into America．From that moment onward until today there have been ten distinct boycotts which can be considered as national in scope（besides anti-foreign movements of a local character）, nine of which were directed against Japan/1 and one only against the United Kingdom.
Causes of these boycott movements.
If these boycotts are studied in detail, it will be found that each of them can be traced back to a definite fact, event or incident, generally of a political nature and interpreted by China as directed against her material interests or detrimental to her national prestige．Thus, the boycott of 1931 was started as a direct sequel to the massacre of Koreans in July, following the Wanpaoshan incident in June of that year, and has been accentuated by the events at Mukden in September and at Shanghai in January, 1932．Each boycott has its own immediately traceable cause, but none of the causes in themselves would have initiated economic retaliation on so extensive a scale had it not been for the mass psychology described in CHAPTER Ⅰ．The factors contributing to the creation of this psychology are: a conviction of injustice（rightly or wrongly considered as such）, an inherited faith in Chinese cultural superiority over foreigners, and a fervent nationalism of a western type, mainly defensive in aims but in which certain aggressive tendencies are not lacking.
Boycott movements before 1925.
Although a Society for the Regeneration of China（Hsing Chung Hui）, which may be considered the progenitor of the Kuomintang, was founded as far back as 1893, and although there can be no doubt that all the boycotts from 1905 to 1925 were launched with the war-cry of Nationalism, there is no concrete evidence that the original nationalist associations, and later the Kuomintang, had a direct hand in their organisation．Inspired by Dr．Sun Yat-sen's new creed, Chambers of Commerce and Student Unions were fully capable of such a task, guided as they were by century-old secret societies, guild experience and guild mentality．The merchants furnished the technical knowledge, means of organisation and rules of procedure, while the students inspired the movements with the enthusiasm of their newly acquired conviction and their spirit of determination in the national cause, and helped to put them into operation．While the students were generally moved by nationalistic feelings alone, the Chambers of Commerce, though sharing these feelings, thought it wise to participate from a desire to control the operation of the boycott．The actual rules of the earlier boycotts were designed to prevent the purchase of the goods of the country against which the boycott was directed．Gradually, however, the field of action was extended to a refusal to export Chinese goods to the country concerned, or to sell or render services to its nationals in China．Finally, the avowed purpose of the more recent boycotts has become to sever completely all economic relations with the “enemy country”.
It should be pointed out that the rules thus established were never carried out to the fullest extent, for reasons which have been fully dealt with in the special study annexed to this report．Generally speaking, the boycotts have always had more impetus in the South, where nationalistic feelings found their first and most fervent adherents, than in the North, Shantung especially having withheld support.
Boycott movement since 1925．Action of the Kuomintang Party.
From 1925 onward a definite change took place in the boycott organisation．The Kuomintang, having from its creation supported the movement, increased its control with each successive boycott until today it is the real organising, driving, co-ordinating and supervising factor in these demonstrations.
In doing this, the Kuomintang, as indicated by evidence in the possession of the Commission, did not dismiss the associations which had hitherto been responsible for the direction of boycott movements．It rather co-ordinated their efforts, systematised and made uniform their methods, and put unreservedly behind the movement the moral and material weight of its powerful party organisation．Having branches all over the country, possessing vast propaganda and information services, and inspired by a strong nationalistic sentiment, it rapidly succeeded in organising and stimulating a movement which had, up to that time, been somewhat sporadic, as a consequence, the coercive authority of the organisers of the boycotts over the merchants and the general public became stronger than ever before, although at the same time a fair margin of autonomy and initiative was left to the individual boycott associations.
Methods employed.
The boycott rules continued to vary according to local conditions but parallel with the strengthening of the organisation, the methods employed by the Boycott Societies became more uniform, more strict and effective．At the same time the Kuomintang Party issued instructions prohibiting the destruction of commercial houses belonging to Japanese or the infliction of physical harm．This does not mean that the lives of Japanese in China have never been threatened in the course of a boycott, but as a whole it may be stated that during the more recent boycotts, acts of violence against Japanese subjects have been less numerous and serious than in earlier days.
An examination of the technique of the methods employed shows that the atmosphere of popular sentiment without which no boycott could succeed is created by a formidable propaganda uniformly carried out all over the country, using slogans well chosen to incite the popular mind against the “enemy” country.
Anti-Japanese propaganda.
In the present boycott directed against Japan which the Commission has seen in operation, every available means was employed to impress upon the people the patriotic duty of not buying Japanese goods．The columns of the Chinese press were filled with propaganda of this kind, the walls of buildings in the towns were covered with posters, often of an extremely violent character/1; anti-Japanese slogans were printed on currency notes, on letters and telegram-forms; chain letters went from hand to hand, etc．These examples were by no means exhaustive, but serve to show the nature of the methods employed．The fact that this propaganda does not differ essentially from that used in certain countries of Europe and America during the World War 1914—1918 only proves the degree of hostility towards Japan which the Chinese have come to feel as a result of the political tension between the two countries.
Boycott rules adopted by Anti-Japanese Associations.
Essential as the political atmosphere of a boycott may be to its ultimate success, nevertheless no such movement could be effective if the boycott associations had not secured a certain uniformity in their rules of procedure．The four general principles adopt at the first meeting of the Shanghai Anti-Japanese Association held on July 17th, 1931, may serve as an illustration of the main objects aimed at by these rules．They were:
a．To withdraw the orders for Japanese goods already ordered;
b．To stop shipment of Japanese goods already ordered but not yet consigned;
c．To refuse to accept Japanese goods already in the godowns but not yet paid for;
d．To register with the Anti-Japanese Association, Japanese goods already purchased and to suspend temporarily the selling of these goods．The procedure of registration will be separately decided upon.
Subsequent resolutions adopted by the same Association are much more detailed and contain provisions for all possible cases and eventualities.
A powerful means of enforcing the boycotts is the compulsory registration of Japanese goods held in stock by Chinese merchants．Inspectors of the Anti-Japanese societies watch the movement of Japanese goods, examine those of doubtful origin in order to ascertain whether or not they are Japanese, undertake raids on stores and godowns where they suspect the presence of non-registered Japanese goods, and bring to the attention of their principals any case of the violation of the rules they may discover．Merchants who are found to be guilty of such a breach of the rules are fined by the Boycott Associations themselves and publicly exposed to popular disapproval, while the goods in their possession are confiscated and sold at public auction, the proceeds going into the funds of the Anti-Japanese organisation.
The boycott is not limited to trade alone．Chinese are warned not to travel on Japanese ships, to use Japanese banks or to serve Japanese in any capacity, either in business or in domestic service．Those who disregard these instructions are subjected to various forms of disapproval and intimidation.
Another feature of this boycott, as of previous ones, is the wish not only to injure Japanese industries, but to further Chinese industries by stimulating the production of certain articles which have hitherto been imported from Japan．The principal result has been an extension of the Chinese textile industry at the expense of the Japanese-owned mills in the Shanghai area.
Fluctuations of the Boycott movement in 1931—32.
The boycott of 1931, organised on the lines just described, continued until about December of that year, 1932, when a certain relaxation became apparent．In January, 1932, in the course of the negotiations then proceeding between the Mayor of Greater Shanghai and the Japanese Consul-General in that city, the Chinese even undertook to dissolve voluntarily the local anti-Japanese association.
Material effects of boycott movement.
During the hostilities in Shanghai, and the months immediately following the evacuation of the Japanese troops, the boycott, although never completely abandoned, was moderated, and during late spring and early summer it even looked as if Japanese trade in different parts of the country might resume．Then, quite suddenly, at the end of July and beginning August, coinciding with the reported military activity on the borders of Jehol, there was a marked revival of the boycott movement．Articles urging the people not to buy Japanese goods appeared anew in the Chinese press, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce published a letter suggesting the resumption of the boycott, and the Coal Merchants' Guild in the same city decided to restrict to the minimum the importation of Japanese coal．At the same time more violent methods were employed, such as the throwing of a bomb into the compound of a coal dealer suspected of having handled Japanese coal, and the sending of letters to storekeepers threatening to destroy their property unless they stopped selling Japanese commodities．Some of the letters reproduced in the newspapers were signed the “Blood and Iron Group”—or the “Blood and Soul Group for the punishment of traitors”.
Such is the situation at the time of writing this Report．This recrudescence of the boycott activity caused the Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai to lodge a formal protest with the local authorities.
The various boycott movements, and the present one in particular, have seriously affected Sino-Japanese relations, both in a material and in a psychological sense.
As far as the material effects are concerned—that is, the loss of trade—the Chinese have a tendency to understate them in their desire to present the boycott as rather a moral protest than as an act of economic injury, while the Japanese attach too absolute a value to certain trade statistics．The arguments used in this connection by the two parties are examined in the annexed Study already referred to．In that Study will also be found full particulars of the extent of the damage done to Japanese trade, which has certainly been considerable.
Another aspect of the subject should also be mentioned．The Chinese themselves suffer losses from goods already paid for, not registered with the Boycott Associations, and seized for public auction; from lines paid to the associations for violation of the boycott rules; from revenue not received by the Chinese Maritime Customs; and generally speaking, from loss of trade．These losses are considerable.
The psychological effect on Sino-Japanese relations.
The psychological effect of the boycott on Sino-Japanese relations, although even more difficult to estimate than the material effect, is certainly not less serious in that it has had a disastrous repercussion on the feelings of large sections of Japanese public opinion towards China．During the visit of the Commission to Japan, both the Tokyo and the Osaka Chambers of Commerce stressed this subject.
The knowledge that Japan is suffering injuries against which she cannot protect herself has exasperated Japanese public opinion．The merchants whom we interviewed at Osaka were inclined to exaggerate certain abuses of boycott methods, such as racketeering and blackmailing, and to under-estimate or even to deny completely the close relationship between Japan's recent policy towards China and the use of the boycott as a defensive weapon against that policy．On the contrary, instead of regarding the boycott as China's weapon of defence, these Japanese merchants insisted that it was an act of aggression against which the Japanese military measures were a retaliation．Anyway there is no doubt that the boycott has been amongst the causes which have profoundly embittered the relations between China and Japan in recent years.
Controversial issues in connection with the boycott.
There are three controversial issues involved in the policy and methods of the boycott.
（1）Whether the movement is spontaneous or organized.
The first is the question whether the movement is purely spontaneous, as the Chinese themselves claim, or whether, as the Japanese allege, it is an organised movement imposed upon the people by the Kuomintang, by methods which at times amount to terrorism．On this subject much may be said on both sides．On the one hand it would appear to be impossible for a nation to exhibit the degree of co-operation and sacrifice involved in the maintenance of a boycott over a wide area and for a long period if there did not exist a foundation of strong popular feeling．On the other hand, it has been clearly shown to what extent the Kuomintang, using the mentality and the methods which the Chinese people have inherited from their old guilds and secret societies, has taken control of the recent boycotts, and particularly of the present one．The rules, the discipline, and the sanctions used against the “traitors”, which form such an essential part of the present boycott, show that however spontaneous, the movement is certainly strongly organised.
All popular movements require some measure of organisation to be effective．The loyalty of all adherents to a common cause is never uniformly strong, and discipline is required to enforce unity of purpose and action．Our conclusion is that the Chinese boycotts are both popular and organised; that though they originate in and are supported by strong national sentiment, they are controlled and directed by organisations which can start or call them off, and that they are enforced by methods which certainly amount to intimidation．While many separate bodies are involved in the organisation, the main controlling authority is the Kuomintang.
（2）Legality or otherwise of boycott methods.
The second issue is whether or not in the conduct of the boycott movement the methods employed have always been legal．From the evidence collected by the Commission it is difficult to draw any other conclusion than that illegal acts have been constantly committed, and that they have not been sufficiently suppressed by the authorities and the courts．The fact that these methods are mainly the same as those used in China in olden days may be an explanation but not a justification．When in former days a Guild elected to declare a boycott, searched the houses of suspected members, brought them before the Guild Court, punished them for a breach of rules, imposed fines and sold the goods seized, it acted in conformity with the customs of that time．Moreover, it was an internal affair of a Chinese community, and no foreigner was involved．The present situation is different．China has adopted a code of modern laws, and these are incompatible with the traditional methods of trade boycotts in China．The memorandum in which the Chinese Assessor has defended his country's point of view with regard to the boycott does not contest this statement but argues that “the boycott...is pursued, generally speaking, in a legitimate manner”．The evidence at the disposal of the Commission does not bear out this contention.
In this connection a distinction should be made between the illegal acts committed directly against foreign residents, in casu Japanese, and those committed against Chinese with the avowed intention, however, of causing damage to Japanese interests．As far as the former are concerned, they are clearly not only illegal under the laws of China but also incompatible with treaty obligations to protect life and property, and to maintain liberty of trade, residence, movement and action．This is not contested by the Chinese, and the boycott associations, as well as the Kuomintang authorities, have tried, although they may not always have been successful, to prevent offences of this kind．As already stated they have occurred less frequently during the present boycott than on previous occasions./1
With regard to illegal acts committed against the Chinese, the Chinese Assessor observed on page 17 of his memorandum on the boycott:
“We would like to observe in the first place that a foreign nation is not authorised to raise a question of internal law．In fact, we find ourselves confronted with acts denounced as unlawful but committed by Chinese nationals in prejudice to other Chinese nationals．Their suppression is a matter for the Chinese authorities, and it seems to us that no one has the right of calling into account the manner in which the Chinese penal law is applied in matters where both offenders and sufferers belong to our own nationality．No state has the right of intervention in the administration of exclusively domestic affairs of another state．This is what the principle of mutual respect for each others' sovereignty and independence means.”
So stated, the argument is incontestable, but it overlooks the fact that the ground of the Japanese complaint is not that one Chinese national has been illegally injured by another, but that the injury has been done to Japanese interests by the employment of methods which are illegal under Chinese law, and that failure to enforce the law in such circumstances implies the responsibility of the Chinese Government for the injury done to Japan.
（3）Responsibility of the Chinese Government for the boycott.
This leads to a consideration of the last controversial point involved in the policy of the boycott—namely the extent of the responsibility of the Chinese Government．The Chinese official attitude is that “the liberty of choice in making purchases is a personal right which no government can interfere with; while the governments are responsible for the protection of lives and property, they are not required by any commonly-recognised regulations and principles to prohibit and punish the exercise of an elemental right of every citizen.”
The Commission has been supplied with documentary evidence which is reproduced in the Study No.8 annexed to this Report, and which indicates that the part taken by the Chinese Government in the present boycott has been somewhat more direct than the quotation above would tend to indicate．We do not suggest that there is anything improper in the fact that Government Departments should support the boycott movement: we only wish to point out that official encouragement involves a measure of Government responsibility．In this connection the question of relations between the Government and the Kuomintang must be considered．Of the responsibility of the latter there can be no question．It is the controlling and co-ordinating organ behind the whole boycott movement．The Kuomintang may be the maker and the master of the Government, but to determine at what point the responsibility of the Party ends and that of the Government begins is a complicated problem of constitutional law on which the Commission does not feel it proper to pronounce.
Comments.
The claim of the Government that the boycott is a legitimate weapon of defence against military aggression by a stronger country, especially in cases where methods of arbitration have not previously been utilised, raises a question of a much wider character．No one can deny the right of the individual Chinese to refuse to buy Japanese goods, use Japanese banks, or ships, or to work for Japanese employers, to sell commodities to Japanese, or to maintain social relations with Japanese．Nor is it possible to deny that the Chinese, acting individually or even in organised bodies, are entitled to make propaganda on behalf of these ideas, always subject to the condition, of course, that the methods do not infringe the laws of the land．Whether, however, the organised application of the boycott to the trade of one particular country is consistent with friendly relations or in conformity with treaty obligation is rather a problem of international law than a subject for our Enquiry．We would express the hope, however, that in the interest of all States this problem should be considered at an early date and regulated by international agreement.
In the course of the present chapter it has been shown first that Japan, in connection with her population problem, is seeking to increase her industrial output and to secure for this purpose reliable oversea markets; secondly, that, apart from the export of raw silk to the United States, China constitutes the principal market for Japanese exports and at the same time supplies the Island Empire with an important amount of raw materials and food-stuffs．Further, China has attracted nearly the whole of Japan's foreign investments, and even in her present disturbed and undeveloped condition, offers a profitable field to Japanese economic and financial activities of various types．Finally, an analysis of the injury caused to Japanese interests in China by the various boycotts which have succeeded one another from 1908 until today has drawn attention to the vulnerable character of these interests.
The dependence of Japan on the Chinese market is fully recognised by the Japanese themselves．On the other hand, China is a country which stands in the most urgent need of development in all fields of economic life, and Japan, which in 1931, notwithstanding the boycott, occupied the first place in her total foreign trade, seems more than any other foreign Power indicated as an ally in economic matters.
The interdependence of the trade of these two neighbouring countries and the interests of both call for an economic rapprochement, but there can be no such rapprochement so long as the political relations between them are so unsatisfactory as to call forth the use of military force by one and the economic force of the boycott by the other.
(1) 原编辑者注：BOYCOTT: The word was first used in Ireland and was derived from the name of Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott（1832—97）, agent for the estates of the Earl of Erne in County Mayo．For refusing in 1880 to receive rents at figures fixed by the tenants, Captain Boycott's life was threatened, his servants were compelled to leave him, his fences torn down, his letters intercepted and his food supplies interfered with．The term soon came into common English use, and was speedily adopted into many foreign languages.
Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th．edition, 1929.
(2) 原编辑者注：See special study No.8 on this subject annexed to this Report.
(3) 原编辑者注：Figures for 1929—Japan Year Book of 1931.
(4) 编者按：即中国和中国东北地区。下同。
(5) 原编辑者注：According to another estimate, Japan's investments in China, including Manchuria, total approximately ￥1,800,000,000.
(6) 原编辑者注：The date and immediate cause of each of these boycotts is:
1908 The Tatsu Maru incident.
1909 The Antung-Mukden Railway question.
1915 The “21 Demands”.
1919 The Shantung question.
1923 Port Arthur and Dairen recovery question.
1925 May 30th incident.
1927 Despatch of troops to Shantung.
1928 Tsinan incident.
1931 The Manchurian affair（Wanpaoshan and Mukden events）.
(7) 原编辑者注：In most cities visited, by the Commission these posters had been removed beforehand but declarations from reliable local witnesses who often possessed samples of these posters bore out the fact mentioned above．Moreover, samples are to be found in the archives of the Commission.
(8) 原编辑者注：According to recent Japanese information, there were 35 instances in which goods belonging to Japanese merchants were seized and kept in detention by members of the Anti-Japanese Associations in Shanghai during the period from July, 1931 to the end of December, 1931．The value of the goods involved was estimated approximately at 287,000 dollars．Of these instances, in August, 1932, five were reported as still remaining unsolved.