2009年对外经济贸易大学815经济学综合考研真题
一、单项选择题（每小题1分，共10分）
1如果玉米是猪的一种饲料，则对玉米市场的最低限价会导致（ ）。
A．玉米需求减少，价格下降
B．玉米价格上升，猪肉供给量减少
C．猪肉供给减少，价格上涨
D．猪肉需求减少，价格下降
2电影票的市场需求为Q＝500－10P，如果电影票的价格为30元/张，市场的消费者剩余等于（ ）。
A．1000元
B．2000元
C．4000元
D．6000元
3在完全竞争市场中，只有符合（ ）条件的产量才是短期中利润最大化的产量。
A．P＝SMC，且SMC＞SAC
B．P＝SMC，且SMC＜SAC
C．P＝SMC，且SMC递增
D．P＝SMC，且SMC递减
4某产品的市场需求函数为Q＝200－10P，当产品定价为12元时，根据勒纳的垄断势力度指标，可知该产品的边际成本为（ ）元。
A．2
B．4
C．8
D．10
5垄断竞争厂商在长期均衡条件下（ ）。
A．超额利润为零
B．价格高于边际成本
C．在均衡点上主观需求曲线的弹性大于实际需求曲线的弹性
D．以上说法均正确
6货币乘数的大小（ ）。
A．不受中央银行行为的影响
B．随着高能货币的减少而减少
C．随着通货-存款比率的下降而下降
D．随着准备金比率的下降而上升
7根据永久收入消费理论，永久收入的边际消费倾向应该（ ）现期收入的边际消费倾向。
A．大于
B．小于
C．等于
D．均有可能
8以下情形中国民收入最多的是（ ）。
A．政府转移支付增加500亿美元
B．储蓄增加500亿美元
C．政府国防开支增加500亿美元
D．个人所得税减少250亿美元
9许多经济学家认为轻微的通货膨胀可以扩大产出和就业，这主要指的是（ ）。
A．需求拉动型通货膨胀
B．利润推动型通货膨胀
C．结构性通货膨胀
D．工资推动型通货膨胀
10在解释工资黏性的内部人—外部人模型中，外部人是（ ）。
A．企业外部已经处于失业的劳动者
B．企业外部的政府官员
C．其他企业中已就业的工人
D．企业内部已经就业的工人
二、判断下列表述的经济含义是否正确（每小题1分，共10分）
1如果某产品需求曲线向右下方倾斜，则可判定它必为正常品。（ ）
2若对某消费者来说，货币的边际效用随收入的增加而递减，则表明该消费者是风险爱好者。（ ）
3如果一项经济活动属于外部不经济活动，那么该经济活动的私人成本小于社会成本。（ ）
4若劳动的供给曲线是完全无弹性的，则经济租金等于零。（ ）
5商品交换的契约曲线表明了两种商品配置最优的所有可能性。（ ）
6社会保险税的增加并不影响国内生产总值、国内生产净值、国民收入，但会直接影响个人可支配收入。（ ）
7国民经济中只要有摩擦性失业或自愿性失业存在，就不能说经济实现了充分就业。（ ）
8乘数原理说明国民收入的决定，加速原理说明投资的决定。（ ）
9当人们预期利率下降，他们将出售债券。（ ）
10在开放经济中，一国只有通过实施货币政策而不是财政政策才能实现充分就业和国际收支平衡。（ ）
三、名词解释（每小题4分，共16分）
1替代效应
2逆淘汰（逆向选择）
3货币非中性
4索洛剩余
四、计算分析题（共20分）
1某公司有如下生产函数：Q（K，L）＝3lnK＋2lnL。若资本价格为4元，劳动价格为6元，问：
（1）若公司已经拥有资本K＝1800单位，为了使生产成本最小，该公司应雇佣多少劳动力？
（2）若劳动为固定要素，资本是变动要素，厂商生产产品的边际成本是多少？
2假设某经济体的消费函数为C＝400＋0.8Y，投资函数为I＝100－50r，政府购买为G＝100，货币需求函数为L＝150＋0.5Y－125r，货币供给M＝1150，价格水平P＝1。
（1）写出IS、LM方程。
（2）计算均衡的国民收入和利率。
（3）如果该国充分就业的国民收入是4000，若用增加政府购买实现充分就业，应该增加多少政府购买。
五、证明与简答题（每小题8分，共16分）
1寡头垄断市场的需求曲线为P＝a－bQ，n个具有相同边际成本c的厂商，以古诺方式竞争生产相同的产品，证明：当n趋向于无穷大时，该产品的市场价格等于边际成本。
2简述税收制度如何发挥财政的自动稳定器功能。
六、论述题（每小题14分，共28分）
1运用微观经济学的理论并结合实际分析我国以保护价（支持价）敞开收购农民余粮的福利效应。
2中国在实现经济结构调整中希望刺激消费的同时相对减少投资。根据IS-LM模型，你认为政府可以采取什么政策来达到这种经济结构的调整？分别指出这些政策发挥作用的传导机制和对宏观经济总量（收入、投资、利率等）的具体影响。
七、英译汉（共三段，共50分）
1. Taking another road（20分）
Less than a month after losing its first legal dispute with the World Trade Organization (WTO), China has introduced a new tax that will achieve much of what it originally wanted, only by another route. Moreover, it is a “green” tax. Who could object to that?
For the past few years, China has imposed a special 25% tariff on imported car parts, rather than the usual 10%, if the parts made up more than half of the value of a vehicle. This was to encourage foreign carmakers to use more local suppliers and reduce imports. But America, the European Union and Canada argued that the tariff was against WTO rules. In July the WTO, based in Geneva, agreed. China may yet appeal. In the meantime, the government has found another way to reduce the flow of expensive automotive imports. On August 13th the government announced a new “green” tax that will come into effect on September 1st. The new tax is meant to reduce fuel consumption and fight pollution. Rather than further raising the tax on fuel, which increased by almost 20% in June, the government is taxing gas-guzzling cars. By an amazing coincidence, most such cars are foreign-made.
Cars with engine capacities larger than 4.1 litres will now incur a 40% sales tax-twice the previous level. Cars with engines between 3 and 4.1 litres will be taxed at 25%, up from 15%. The tax on the smallest cars, with engines smaller than 1 litre, will fall from 3% to 1%. The 8% and 10% taxes on other cars will not change. The government says the new tax will encourage a shift to more fuel-efficient cars. It will also help Chinese carmakers, as they tend to make cars with engines smaller than 2.5 litres. Foreign carmakers, which make most of the cars with larger engines, will suffer.
China’s new tax is canny. It cuts fuel use, reduces imports, benefits local carmakers and may help to improve air quality. It also prevents any more pesky calls from Geneva.
2. Credit Derivatives（20分）
Until last year credit-default swaps (CDSs) were hailed as wonder of modern finance. These derivatives allow sellers to take on new credit exposure and buyers to insure against companies or governments failing to honour their debts. The notional value of outstanding CDSs exploded from almost nil a decade ago to $62 trillion at the end of 2007. Traded privately, or “over the counter”, by banks, they seemed to prove that large, new fangled markets could function perfectly well with minimal regulation.
That view now looks quaint. Since September a wave of large defaults and near-misses, involving tottering banks, brokers, insurers and America’s giant mortgages agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, has sent the CDS market reeling. Concern that CDSs are partly to blame for wild swings in financial shares has frayed nerves further.
The failure in mid-September of Lehman Brothers showed that the main systemic risk posed by CDSs came not from widespread losses on underlying debts but from the demise of a big dealer. The aftershock spread well beyond derivatives. Almost as traumatic was the rescue of American International Group (AIG), a huge insurer that had sold credit protection on some $440 billion of elaborate structures packed with mortgages and corporate debt, known as collateralised-debt obligations (CDOs). Had AIG been allowed to go bust, the swaps market might well have unravelled.
Foul-ups with derivatives are hardly uncommon, but CDSs have been causing particular consternation. One reason is the broad threat of “counterparty risk”—the possibility that a seller or buyer cannot meet its obligations. Another is the rickety state of back-office plumbing, which was neglected as the market boomed. A third is that swaps can be used to hide credit risk from markets, since positions do not have to be accounted for on balance-sheets. They make it beguilingly easy to concentrate risk.
Originally conceived as a means for banks to reduce their credit exposure to large corporate clients, CDSs quickly became the instruments of speculation for pension funds, insurers, companies and (especially) hedge funds. And with no fixed supply of raw material, unlike stocks or bonds, bets could be almost limitless.
The root cause of the crisis, some expert argues, is bad mortgage lending, not derivatives: swaps on subprime mortgages grew unstable because the loans themselves were dodgy. Last month one of the CDS market’s founder urged regulators to distinguish between tools and their users: “Tools that transfer risk can also increase systemic risk if major counterparties fail to manage their exposures properly.”
3. Export and import prohibitions（10分）
If the embargo prohibits the export or import of goods except under license, one of the parties may thereby be placed under an implied duty to use reasonable endeavours to obtain a license. Failure to fulfill that duty will preclude the party in default from relying on frustration as a ground of discharge, unless he proves that any steps he could have taken to obtain a license would have been useless.
A similar, but distinct problem arises where legislation in force at the time the contract is made imposes a similar prohibition. If one party expressly or impliedly undertaken to use reasonable endeavours to obtain a license, but with due diligence has been unable to do so, he will normally be released from ability. There is some doubt, however, whether such inability to obtain a license under an existing licensing system is properly to be regarded as frustration.