第41章 Chapter 20 Of the Requisites to the Constitution o
5. The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth to another, or others, the right of protecting and defending himself by his own power, is the security which he expecteth thereby, of protection and defence from those to whom he doth so relinquish it. And a man may then account himself in the estate of security, when he can foresee no violence to be done unto him, from which the doer may not be deterred by the power of that sovereign, to whom they have every one subjected themselves; and without that security there is no reason for a man to deprive himself of his own advantages, and make himself a prey to others. And therefore when there is not such a sovereign power erected, as may afford this security; it is to be understood that every man's right of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth still with him. And contrariwise, where any subject hath right by his own judgment and discretion, to make use of his force; it is to be understood that every man hath the like, and consequently that there is no commonwealth at all established. How far therefore in the making of a commonwealth, a man subjecteth his will to the power of others, must appear from the end, namely security. For whatsoever is necessary to be by covenant transferred for the attaining thereof, so much is transferred, or else every man is in his natural liberty to secure himself.
6. Covenants agreed upon by every man assembled for the making of a commonwealth, and put in writing without erecting of a power of coercion, are no reasonable security for any of them that so covenant, nor are to be called laws; and leave men still in the estate of nature and hostility. For seeing the wills of most men are governed only by fear, and where there is no power of coercion, there is no fear; the wills of most men will follow their passions of covetousness, lust, anger, and the like, to the breaking of those covenants, whereby the rest, also, who otherwise would keep them, are set at liberty, and have no law but from themselves.
7. This power of coercion, as hath been said chap. XV, sect.
3, of the former part, consisteth in the transferring of every man's right of resistance against him to whom he hath transferred the power of coercion. It followeth therefore, that no man in any commonwealth whatsoever hath right to resist him, or them, on whom they have conferred this power coercive, or (as men use to call it) the sword of justice; supposing the not-resistance possible. For (Part I. chapter XV, sect. 18) covenants bind but to the utmost of our endeavour.
8. And forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in security, by the means of this sword of justice that keeps them all in awe, are nevertheless in danger of enemies from without; if there be not some means found, to unite their strengths and natural forces in the resistance of such enemies, their peace amongst themselves is but in vain. And therefore it is to be understood as a covenant of every member to contribute their several forces for the defence of the whole; whereby to make one power as sufficient, as is possible, for their defence. Now seeing that every man hath already transferred the use of his strength to him or them, that have the sword of justice; it followeth that the power of defence, that is to say the sword of war, be in the same hands wherein is the sword of justice: and consequently those two swords are but one, and that inseparably and essentially annexed to the sovereign power.
9. Moreover seeing to have the right of the sword, is nothing else but to have the use thereof depending only on the judgment and discretion of him or them that have it; it followeth that the power of judicature (in all controversies, wherein the sword of justice is to be used) and (in all deliberations concerning war, wherein the use of that sword is required), the right of resolving and determining what is to be done, belong to the same sovereign.
10. Farther: considering it is no less, but much more necessary to prevent violence and rapine, than to punish the same when it is committed; and all violence proceedeth from controversies that arise between men concerning meum and tuum, right and wrong, good and bad, and the like, which men use every one to measure by their own judgments; it belongeth also to the judgment of the same sovereign power, to set forth and make known the common measure by which every man is to know what is his, and what another's; what is good, and what bad; and what he ought to do, and what not; and to command the same to be observed. And these measures of the actions of the subjects are those which men call LAWS POLITIC, or civil. The making whereof must of right belong to him that hath the power of the sword, by which men are compelled to observe them; for otherwise they should be made in vain.
11. Farthermore: seeing it is impossible that any one man that hath such sovereign power, can be able in person to hear and determine all controversies, to be present at all deliberations concerning common good, and to execute and perform all those common actions that belong thereunto, whereby there will be necessity of magistrates and ministers of public affairs; it is consequent, that the appointment, nomination, and limitation of the same, be understood as an inseparable part of the same sovereignty, to which the sum of all judicature and execution hath been already annexed.
12. And: forasmuch as the right to Use the forces of every particular member, is transferred from themselves, to their sovereign; a man will easily fall upon this conclusion of himself: that to sovereign power (whatsoever it doth) there belongeth impunity.