第95章

(2) The world of science, or of physical things as the learned conceive them, with secondary qualities and 'forces' (in the popular sense) excluded, and nothing real but solids and fluids and their 'laws' (i.e., customs)

of motion.

(3) The world of ideal relations, or abstract truths believed or believable by all, and expressed in logical, mathematical, metaphysical, ethical, or aesthetic propositions.

(4) The world of 'idols of the tribe,' illusions or prejudices common to the race.All educated people recognize these as forming one sub-universe.

The motion of the sky round the earth, for example, belongs to this world.

That motion is not a recognized item of any of the other worlds; but as an 'idol of the tribe' it really exists.For certain philosophers 'matter'

exists only as an idol of the tribe.For science, the 'secondary qualities'

of matter are but 'idols of the tribe.'

(5) The various supernatural worlds, the Christian heaven and hell, the world of the Hindoo mythology, the world of Swedenborg's visa et nudita , etc.Each of these is a consistent system, with definite relations among its own parts.Neptune's trident, e.g., has no status of reality whatever in the Christian heaven; but within the classic Olympus certain definite things are true of it, whether one believe in the reality of the classic mythology as a whole or not.The various worlds of deliberate fable may be ranked with these worlds of faith -- the world of the Iliad , that of King Lear , of the Pickwick Pacers , etc.

(6) The various worlds of individual opinion, as numerous as men are.

(7) The worlds of sheer madness and vagary, also indefinitely numerous.

Every object we think of gets at last referred to one world or another of this or of some similar list.It settles into our belief as a common-sense object, a scientific object, an abstract object, a mythological object, an object of some one's mistaken conception, or a madman's object; and it reaches this state sometimes immediately, but often only after being hustled and bandied about amongst other objects until it finds some which will tolerate its presence and stand in relations to it which nothing contradicts.

The molecules and ether-waves of the scientific world, for example, simply kick the object's warmth and color out, they refuse to have any relations with them.But the world of 'idols of the tribe' stands ready to take them in.Just so the world of classic myth takes up the winged horse; the world of individual hallucination, the vision of the candle; the world of abstract truth, the proposition that justice is kingly, though no actual king be just.The various worlds themselves, however, appear (as aforesaid) to most men's minds in no very definitely conceived relation to each other, and our attention, when it turns to one, is apt to drop the others for the time being out of its account.Propositions concerning the different worlds are made from 'different points of view'; and in this more or less chaotic state the consciousness of most thinkers remains to the end.Each world whilst it is attended to is real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention.THE: WORLD OF 'PRACTICAL REALITIES.'

Each thinker, however, has dominant habits of attention; and these practically elect from among the various worlds some one to be for him the world of ultimate realities.From this world's objects he does not appeal.Whatever positively contradicts them must get into another world or die.

The horse, e.g., may have wings to its heart's content, so long as it does not pretend to be the real world's horse -- that horse is absolutely wingless.

For most men, as we shall immediately see, the 'things of sense' hold this prerogative position, and are the absolutely real world's nucleus.Other things, to be sure, may be real for this man or for that things of science, abstract moral relations, things of the Christian theology, or what not.

But even for the special man, these things are usually real with a less real reality than that of the things of sense.They are taken less seriously;

and the very utmost that can be said for anyone's belief in them is that it is as strong as his 'belief in his own senses.

In all this the everlasting partiality of our nature shows itself, our inveterate propensity to choice.For, in the strict and ultimate sense of the word existence, everything which can be thought of at all exists as some sort of object, whether mythical object, individual thinker's object, or object in outer space and for intelligence at large.Errors, fictions, tribal beliefs, are parts of the whole great Universe which God has made, and He must have meant all these things to be in it, each in its respective-

place.But for us finite creatures, " 'tis to consider too curiously to consider so." The mere fact of appearing as an object at all is not enough to constitute reality.That may be metaphysical reality, reality for God; but what we need is practical reality, reality for ourselves;

and, to have that, an object must not only appear, but it must appear both interesting and important.The worlds whose objects are neither interesting nor important we treat simply negatively, we brand them as un real.