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The mental states usually distinguished as feelings are the emotions , and the sensations we get from skin, muscle, viscus, eye, ear, nose, and palate.The 'thoughts,' as recognized in popular parlance, are the conceptions and judgments.When we treat of these mental states in particular we shall have to say a word about the cognitive function and value of each.It may perhaps be well to notice now that our senses only give us acquaintance with facts of body, and that of the mental states of other persons we only have conceptual knowledge.Of our own past states of mind we take cognizance in a peculiar way.They are 'objects of memory,'

and appear to us endowed with a sort of warmth and intimacy that makes the perception of them seem more like a process of sensation than like a thought.Footnotes Messrs.Payton-Spence (Journal of Spec.Phil., X.

338, XIV.286) and M.M.Garver (Amer.Jour.

of Science, 3d series, XX.189) argue, the one from speculative, the other from experimental grounds, that, the physical condition of consciousness being neural vibration, the consciousness must itself be incessantly interrupted by unconsciousness - about fifty times a second, according to Garver.

That the appearance of mental activity here is real can be proved by suggesting to the 'hypnotized' somnambulist that he shall remember when he awakes.He will then often do so.

For more details, cf.Malebranche, Rech.de la Verité, bk.III.chap.I; J.Locke, Essay conc.H.U., book II.

ch.I; C.Wolf, Psychol.rationalis, § 59; Sir W.Hamilton, Lectures on Metaph., lecture XVII; J.Bascom, Science of Mind, § 12; Th.Jouffroy, Mélanges Philos., 'du Sommeil'; H.Holland, Chapters on Mental Physiol., p.80; B.Brodie, Psychol.Researches, p.147; E.M.Chesley, Journ.of Spec.Phil., vol.XI.p.72; Th.Ribot, Maladies de la Personnalité, pp.8-10; H.Lotze, Metaphysics, § 533.

L'Automatisme Psychologique, Paris, 1889, passim.

See his articles in the Chicago Open Court, for July, August and November, 1889.Also in the Revue Philosophique for 1889

and '90.

This whole phenomena shows how an idea which remains itself below the threshold of a certain conscious self may occasion associative effects therein.The skin-sensations unfelt by the patient's primary consciousness awaken nevertheless their usual visual associates therein.

See Proceedings of American Soc.for Psych.Research, vol.I.p.548.

Proceedings of the (London) Soc.for Psych.Research, May 1887, p.268 ff.

M.Janet designates by numbers the different personalities which the subject may display.

How to conceive of this state of mind is not easy.It would be much simpler to understand the process, if adding new strokes made the first one visible.There would then be two different objects apperceived as totals, - paper with one stroke, paper with many strokes;

and, blind to the former, he would see all that was in the latter, because he would have apperceived it as a different total in the first instance.

A process of this sort occurs sometimes (not always) when the new strokes, instead of being mere repetitions of the original one, are lines which combine with it into a total object, say a human face.The subject of the trance then may regain his sight of the line to which he had previously been blind, by seeing it as part of the face.

Perception of Space and Matter, 1879, part II.

chap.3.

For a very good condensed history of the various opinions, see W.Volkmann von Volkmar, Lehrbuch d.Psychologie, §

16.Anm.Complete references to Sir W.Hamilton are given in J.E.Walter, Perception of Space and Matter, pp.65-6.

Most contemporary writers ignore the question of the soul's seat.Lotze is the only one who seems to have been much concerned about it, and his views have varied.Cf.Medicinische Psychol., §

10.Microcosmus, bk.III.ch.2.Metaphysic, bk.III.ch.5.Outlines of Psychol., part II.ch.3.See also G.T.Fechner, Psychophysik, chap.XXXVII.

I purposely ignore 'clairvoyance' and action upon distant things by 'mediums,' as not yet matters of common consent.

I disregard consequences which may later come to the thing from the fact that it is known.The knowing per se in no wise affects the thing.

B.P.Bowne: Metaphysics, pp.407-10.Cf.also Lotze: Logik, §§ 308, 326-7.

Cf.John Grote: Exploratio Philosophica, p.60;

H.Helmholtz, Popular Scientific Lectures, London, p.308-9.