第14章

and since one of the greatest obstacles to mutual understanding in philosophy is the use of words eulogistically and disparagingly, impartial terms ought always, if possible, to be preferred.The word psychosis has been proposed by Mr.Huxley.It has the advantage of being correlative to neurosis (the name applied by the same author to the corresponding nerve-process), and is moreover technical and devoid of partial implications.But it has no verb or other grammatical form allied to it.The expressions 'affection of the soul,' 'modification of the ego,' are clumsy, like 'state of consciousness,'

and they implicitly assert theories which it is not well to embody in terminology before they have been openly discussed and approved.'Idea' is a good vague neutral word, and was by Locke employed in the broadest generic way ; but notwithstanding his authority it has not domesticated itself in the language so as to cover bodily sensations.It has no opprobrious connotation such as 'feeling' has, and it immediately suggests the omnipresence of cognition (or reference to an object other than the mental state itself), which we shall soon see to be of the mental life's essence.But can the expression 'thought of a toothache' ever suggest to the reader the actual present pain itself? It is hardly possible ; and we thus seem about to be forced back on some pair of terms like Hume's 'impression and idea,' or Hamilton's 'presentation and representation,' or the ordinary 'feeling and thought,' if we wish to cover the whole ground.

In this quandary we can make no definitive choice, but must, according to the convenience of the context, use sometimes one, sometimes another of the synonyms that have been mentioned.My own partiality is for either FEELING or THOUGHT.I shall probably often use both words in a wider sense than usual, and alternately startle two classes of readers by their unusual sound ; but if the connection makes it clear that mental states at large, irrespec- tive of their kind, are meant, this will do no harm, and may even do some good.

The inaccuracy of introspective observation has been made a subject of debate.It is important to gain some fixed ideas on this point before we proceed.

The commonest spiritualistic opinion is that the Soul or Subject of the mental life is a metaphysical entity, inaccessible to direct knowledge, and that the various mental states and operations of which we reflectively become aware are objects of an inner sense which does not lay hold of the real agent in itself, any more than sight or hearing gives us direct knowledge of matter in itself.From this point of view introspection is, of course, incompetent to lay hold of anything more than the Soul's phenomena.But even then the question remains, How well can it know the phenomena themselves?

Some authors take high ground here and claim for it a sort of infallibility.

Thus Ueberweg:

"When a mental image, as such, is the object of my apprehension, there is no meaning in seeking to distinguish its existence in my consciousness (in me) from its existence out of my consciousness (in itself) ; for the object apprehended is, in this case, one which does not even exist, as the objects of external perception do, in itself outside of my consciousness.

It exists only within me."

And Brentano:

"The phenomena inwardly apprehended are true in themselves.As they appear - of this the evidence with which they are apprehended is a warrant - so they are in reality.Who, then, can deny that in this a great superiority of Psychology over the physical sciences comes to light?"

And again:

"No one can doubt whether the psychic condition he apprehends in himself be , and be so , as he apprehends it.Whoever should doubt this would have reached that finished doubt which destroys itself in destroying every fixed point from which to make an attack upon knowledge."

Others have gone to the opposite extreme, and maintained that we can have no introspective cognition of our own minds at all.A deliverance of Auguste Comte to this effect has been so often quoted as to be almost classical ; and some reference to it seems therefore indispensable here.

Philosophers, says Comte, have "in these latter days imagined themselves able to distinguish, by a very singular subtlety, two sorts of observation of equal importance, one external, the other internal, the latter being solely destined for the study of intellectual phenomena....I limit myself to pointing out the principal consideration which proves clearly that this pretended direct contemplation of the mind by itself is a pure illusion....It is in fact evident that, by an invincible neccessity, the human mind can observe directly all phenomena except its own proper states.For by whom shall the observation of these be made? It is conceivable that a man might observe himself with respect to the passions that animate him, for the anatomical organs of passion are distinct from those whose function is observation.Though we have all made such observations on ourselves, they can never have much scientific value, and the best mode of knowing the passions will always be that of observing them from without ; for every strong state of passion...is necessarily incompatible with the state of observation.But, as for observing in the same way intellectual phenomena at the time of their actual presence, that is a manifest impossibility.