第43章

'Since then all judgment apprehends the subjects of its thought according to its own nature, and God has a condition of ever-present eternity, His knowledge, which passes over every change of time, embracing infinite lengths of past and future, views in its own direct comprehension everything as though it were taking place in the present.If you would weigh the foreknowledge by which God distinguishes all things, you will more rightly hold it to be a knowledge of a never-failing constancy in the present, than a foreknowledge of the future.Whence Providence is more rightly to be understood as a looking forth than a looking forward, because it is set far from low matters and looks forth upon all things as from a lofty mountain-top above all.Why then do you demand that all things occur by necessity, if divine light rests upon them, while men do not render necessary such things as they can see? Because you can see things of the present, does your sight therefore put upon them any necessity? Page 164Surely not.If one may not unworthily compare this present time with the divine, just as you can see things in this your temporal present, so God sees all things in His eternal present.Wherefore this divine foreknowledge does not change the nature or individual qualities of things: it sees things present in its understanding just as they will result some time in the future.It makes no confusion in its distinctions, and with one view of itS mind it discerns all that shall come to pass whether of necessity or not.For instance, when you see at the same time a man walking on the earth and the sun rising in the heavens, you see each sight simultaneously, yet you distinguish between them, and decide that one is moving voluntarily, the other of necessity.In like manner the perception of God looks down upon all things without disturbing at all their nature, though they are present to Him but future under the conditions of time.Wherefore this foreknowledge is not opinion but knowledge resting upon truth, since He knows that a future event is, though He knows too that it will not occur of necessity.If you answer here that what God sees about to happen, cannot but happen, and that what cannot but happen is bound by necessity, you fasten me down to the word necessity, I will grant that we have a matter of most firm truth, but it is one to which scarce any man can approach unless he be a contemplator of the divine.For I shall answer that such a thing Page 165will occur of necessity, when it is viewed from the point of divine knowledge; but when it is examined in its own nature, it seems perfectly free and unrestrained.For there are two kinds of necessities; one is simple:

for instance, a necessary fact, "all men are mortal "; the other is conditional;for instance, if you know that a man is walking, he must be walking: for what each man knows cannot be otherwise than it is known to be; but the conditional one is by no means followed by this simple and direct necessity;for there is no necessity to compel a voluntary walker to proceed, though it is necessary that, if he walks, he should be proceeding.In the same way, if Providence sees an event in its present, that thing must be, though it has no necessity of its own nature.And God looks in His present upon those future things which come to pass through free will.Therefore if these things be looked at from the point of view of God's insight, they come to pass of necessity under the condition of divine knowledge; if, on the other hand, they are viewed by themselves, they do not lose the perfect freedom of their nature.Without doubt, then, all things that God foreknows do come to pass, but some of them proceed from free will; and though they result by coming into existence, yet they do not lose their own nature, because before they came to pass they could also not have come to pass.

'"What then," you may ask, " is the difference Page 166in their not being bound by necessity, since they result under all circumstances as by necessity, on account of the condition of divine knowledge? " This is the difference, as I just now put forward: take the sun rising and a man walking; while these operations are occurring, they cannot but occur:

but the one was bound to occur before it did; the other was not so bound.

What God has in His present, does exist without doubt; but of such things some follow by necessity, others by their authors' wills.Wherefore I was justified in saying that if these things be regarded from the view of divine knowledge, they are necessary, but if they are viewed by themselves, they are perfectly free from all ties of necessity: just as when you refer all, that is clear to the senses, to the reason, it becomes general truth, but it remains particular if regarded by itself." But," you will say, " if it is in my power to change a purpose of mine, I will disregard Providence, since I may change what Providence foresees." To which I answer, " You can change your purpose, but since the truth of Providence knows in its present that you can do so, and whether you do so, and in what direction you may change it, therefore you cannot escape that divine foreknowledge: