第72章 IV

But indeed[1] with respect to justice and uprightness he not only made no secret of the opinion he held, but gave practical demonstration of it, both in private by his law-abiding and helpful behaviour to all,[2] and in public by obeying the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined, whether in the life of the city or in military service, so that he was a pattern of loyalty to the rest of the world, and on three several occasions in particular: first, when as president (Epistates) of the assembly he would not suffer the sovereign people to take an unconstitutional vote,[3] but ventured, on theside of the laws, to resist a current of popular feeling strong enough, I think, to have daunted any other man. Again, when the Thirty tried to lay some injunction on him contrary to the laws, he refused to obey, as for instance when they forbade his conversing with the young;[4] or again, when they ordered him and certain other citizens to arrest a man to be put to death,[5] he stood out single-handed on the ground that the injunctions laid upon him were contrary to the laws. And lastly, when he appeared as defendant in the suit instituted by Meletus,[6] notwithstanding that it was customary for litigants in the law courts to humour the judges in the conduct of their arguments by flattery and supplications contrary to the laws,[7] notwithstanding also that defendants owed their acquittal by the court to the employment of such methods, he refused to do a single thing however habitual in a court of law which was not strictly legal; and though by only a slight deflection from the strict path he might easily have been acquitted by his judges,[8] he preferred to abide by the laws and die rather than transgress them and live.

[1] L. Dindorf suspects [SS. 1-6, {'Alla men . . . pollakis}], ed. Lips. 1872. See also Praef. to Ox. ed. p. viii.

[2] Or, "by his conduct to all, which was not merely innocent in the eye of law and custom but positively helpful."[3] See above, I. i. 18; "Hell." I. vii. 14, 15; Grote, "H. G." viii. 272.

[4] See above, I. ii. 35.

[5] Leon of Salamis. See "Hell." II. iii. 39; Plat. "Apol." 32 C; Andoc. "de Myst." 46.

[6] See above, I. i. 1; Plat. "Apol." 19 C.

[7] Kuhner cf. Quintil. VI. i. 7: "Athenis affectus movere etiam per praeconem prohibatur orator"; "Apol." 4; Plat. "Apol." 38 D, E.

[8] See Grote, "H. G." viii. p. 663 foll.

These views he frequently maintained in conversation, now with one and now with another, and one particular discussion with Hippias of Elis[9] on the topic of justice and uprightness has come to my knowledge.[10]

[9] For this famous person see Cob. "Pros. Xen." s.n.; Plat. "Hipp.

maj." 148; Quint. xii. 11, 21; Grote, "H. G." viii. 524. [10] Or, "I can personally vouch for."Hippias had just arrived at Athens after a long absence, and chanced to be present when Socrates was telling some listeners how astonishing it was that if a man wanted to get another taught to be a shoemaker or carpenter or coppersmith or horseman, he would have no doubt where to send him for the purpose: "People say,"[11] he added, "that if a man wants to get his horse or his ox taught in the right way,[12] the world is full of instructors; but if he would learn himself, or have his son or his slave taught in the way of right, he cannot tell where to find such instruction."[11] L. Dindorf, after Ruhnken and Valckenar, omits this sentence{phasidetines...didaxonton}.SeeKuhneradloc.Forthe sentiment see Plat. "Apol." 20 A.

[12] Cf. "Cyrop." II. ii. 26; VIII. iii. 38; also "Horsem." iii. 5;"Hunting," vii. 4.

Hippias, catching the words, exclaimed in a bantering tone: What! still repeating the same old talk,[13] Socrates, which I used to hear from you long ago?

[13] This tale is repeated by Dio Chrys. "Or." III. i. 109. Cf. Plat. "Gorg." 490 E.

Yes (answered Socrates), and what is still more strange, Hippias, it is not only the same old talk but about the same old subjects. Now you, I daresay, through versatility of knowledge,[14] never say the same thing twice over on the same subject?

[14] Or, "such is the breadth of your learning," {polumathes}. Cf. Plat. "Hipp. maj."To be sure (he answered), my endeavour is to say something new on all occasions.

What (he asked) about things which you know, as for instance in a case of spelling, if any one asks you, "How many letters in Socrates, and what is their order?"[15] I suppose you try to run off one string of letters to-day and to-morrow another? or to a question of arithmetic, "Does twice five make ten?" your answer to-day will differ from that of ye