第99章 Chapter IV(9)

How,as Mill had asked,in speaking of the economic aspects of government interference,are we to mark out the space which is to be sacred from 'authoritative intrusion'?So long as the social state is simple,the application is easy.When one savage catches the deer,and another the salmon,each may be forbidden to take the other's game by force.Each man has a right to the fruits of his own labour.In the actual state of things there is not this charming simplicity.A man's wealth is not a definable material object,but a bundle of rights of the most complex kind;and rights to various parts of the whole national income,which are the product of whole systems of previous compacts,The possessor has not even in the vaguest sense 'created'his wealth;he has more or less contributed the labour of brains and hands to the adaptation of things to use,or enjoys his rights in virtue of an indefinite number of transactions,bargains made by himself,or bequests transferring the rights to new generations.

To protect his property is to protect a multifarious system of rights accruing in all manner of ways,and to sanction the voluntary contracts in virtue of which the whole elaborate network of rights corresponds to the complex social order.The tacit assumption of the economists was that this order was in some sense 'natural'and law an artificial or extra-natural compulsion.Can the line be drawn?The legal regulation has been an essential though a subordinate part of the whole process.Law,at an early stage,is an undistinguishable part of customs,which has become differentiated from mere custom as settled governments have been evolved and certain definite functions assigned to the sovereign power.We cannot say that one set of institutions is due to law and another to customs or to voluntary contracts.The laws which regulate property in land or inheritance or any form of association have affected every stage of the process and have not affected it as conditions imposed from without,but as a part of the whole elaboration.The principle that 'self-protection'is the only justification of interference then becomes hard of application.I am to do what I like with my own.That may be granted,for 'my own'is that with which I may do what I like.

But if I am allowed in virtue of this doctrine to make any contracts or to dispose of my property in any way that please,it follows that the same sanctity is transferred to the whole system which has grown up by voluntary action at every point,and which is therefore regarded as the 'natural'or spontaneous order.Now the actual course of events,as Mill maintains,produced a society with vast inequalities of wealth a society which,as he declares,does not even show an approximation to justice,or in which a man's fortunes are determined not by his merits but by accident.On this interpretation of the principle of non-interference,it follows that in the name of legal 'liberty'you approve a process destructive of 'liberty'in fact.Every man is allowed no doubt by the laws to act as circumstances admit;but the circumstances may permit some people to enjoy every conceivable pleasure and to develop every faculty,while they condemn others to find their only pleasure in gin,and to have such development as can be acquired in 'London slums.'A famous judge pointed out ironically that the laws of England were the same for the rich and the poor;that is,the same price was charged for justice whether the applicants could afford it or not.Is it not a mockery to tell a man that he is free to do as he pleases,if it only means that he may choose between starvation and the poorhouse?Mill had himself been inclined to remedy the evils by invoking an omnipotent legislature to undertake very drastic measures of reform.Equal laws will produce equal results when,in point of fact,they apply to men under equal conditions.If a society consists of mutually independent and self-supporting individuals,the principle of non-interference may work smoothly.Each man has actually his own secret sphere,and the law only affects the exchange of superfluous advantages among independent units.But that is to say that to make your rule work,you must prevent all that process of development which is implied in civilisation.Society must be forced to be 'individualistic'in order that the formula may be applicable.Self-protection means the protection of existing rights.If they are satisfactory,the result of protecting them will be satisfactory.But if the actual order,however produced,is essentially unjust,the test becomes illusory.Yet,if the laws are to interfere to prevent the growth of inequality,what becomes of the sacred sphere of individuality?

Here we have the often-noted conflict between equality and liberty.Leave men free,and inequalities must arise.Enforce equality and individuality is cramped or suppressed.And yet inequality certainly means a pressure upon the weaker which may lead to virtual slavery.We must admit that neither liberty nor equality can be laid down as absolute principles.The attempt to treat any formula in this fashion leads to the perplexities exemplified in Mill's treatment of the 'liberty'problem.His doctrines cannot be made to fit accurately the complexities of the social order.'Equality'and 'liberty'define essential 'moments'in the argument,though neither can be made to support an absolute conclusion.

The difficulty was indicated in Bentham's treatment of 'security'and 'equality.'Both,he said,were desirable,but when there was a conflict 'equality'must give way to 'security.'

Here we come to another closely allied doctrine.'Security'implies 'responsibility.'A man must be secure that he may be industrious.He will not labour unless he is sure to enjoy the fruit of his labour.This gives the Malthusian vis medicatrix.