第31章 Chapter II(2)

Experience is a word which requires exposition;but in a general way the aim of the Utilitarians is abundantly clear.They attacked 'intuitions'as Locke had attacked 'innate ideas.'The great error of philosophy,according to them,as according to Locke,has been the attempt to transcend the limits of human intelligence,and so to wander into the regions of mysticism;to seek knowledge by spinning logical structures which,having no base in fact,ended in mere scholastic logomachy;or to override experience by claiming absolute authority for theories which dispense with further proof for the simple reason that no proof of them can be given.To limit speculation and to make it fruitful by forcing it from the first to deal with facts;to trace all its evidence to experience or the observation of facts;and to insist upon its verification by comparison with facts,is the main and surely the legitimate purpose of the Utilitarians as of all their philosophical congeners.The gulf between the world of speculation and the world of fact is the great opprobrium of philosophy.The necessity for finding a basis of fact was emphasised at this time by the rapid development of the sciences which may be called purely empirical,and which had sprung,in any case,from methods of direct observation.This development suggested the elaborate treatise written from a different point of view by Whewell.The great ambition of the Benthamites had been to apply scientific methods to all the problems of legislation,jurisprudence,economics,ethics,and philosophy.

Mill could now show,with the involuntary help of Whewell,what those methods really implied The questions remain:What are facts?and,What is experience?and,What are the consequent conditions of reasoning about facts?Admitting that,somehow or other,a vast and rapidly growing body of knowledge has been attained in the physical sciences,we may ask how it has been gained,and proceed to apply the methods in what have been called the moral sciences.Kant's famous problem was,How is a priori synthetic knowledge possible?Mill denies that any such knowledge exists.His problem is therefore,How can knowledge be explained without a priori elements?When this can be satisfactorily done,we shall be able to show how both moral and physical science can be fairly based upon experience.

Mill's view of the proper limits of his inquiry is characteristic.He accepts Bacon's account of logic.It,is the ars artium,the science of science itself.'(6)It implies an investigation into the processes of inference generally.It is not limited to the old formal logic,but includes every operation by which knowledge is extended.It is thus,as he afterwards puts it,the 'theory of proof.'(7)The book,indeed,owes its interest to the width of the field covered.It has not the repulsive dryness of formal logic,but would lead to a natural history of the whole growth of knowledge,and makes constant reference to the actual development of thought.On the other hand,Mill gives notice that he has no more to do with metaphysics than with any of the special sciences.Logic,he declares,is common ground for all schools of philosophy.It is,he says,the office of metaphysics to decide what are ultimate facts,but for the logician it is needless to go into this analysis.(8)Accordingly,he often in the course of the book considers himself entitled to hand over various problems to the metaphysicians.(9)The possibility of really keeping to this distinction is doubtful.Since Mill's very aim is to show that all knowledge comes from observation of 'facts,'it is apparently relevant to inquire what are these 'ultimate facts.'Indeed,his statement,though made in all sincerity,almost suggests a controversial artifice.Logic,as Mill of course admits,affects metaphysics as it affects all sciences;but in one way it affects them very differently.It justifies astronomy,but it apparently makes metaphysics superfluous.Inquiry into the 'ultimate facts'turns out to be either hopeless or meaningless.Mill does not directly assert that all 'ontological'speculations are merely cobwebs of the brain.But he tries to show that,whatever they may be,they are strictly irrelevant in reasoning.All metaphysicians are expected to grant him certain postulates.

These once granted,he will be able to account for the whole structure of knowledge.'Intuitions,'transcendental speculations,and ontology will then be deprived of the whole conditions under which they thrive.I do not now assert,he virtually says,that your doctrine is wrong,but I shall show that it is thrown away.It is a pretence of explaining something which lies altogether beyond the limits of real knowledge,and therefore admits of no explanation.

Mill starts from the classification given in old logical textbooks,to which,different as are his conclusions,he attached a very high value.(10)The schoolmen had by their elaborate acuteness established a whole system of logical distinctions and definitions which are both important and accurate,however sterile the inquiries in which they were used.

The machinery was excellent,though its contrivers forgot that a mill cannot grind out flour if you put in no grain.Mill begins accordingly by classifying the various kinds of words in the light afforded by previous logical systems.