第9章 Liberty Chapter(3)

IV.All men in the State of nature have a desire,and will to hurt,but not proceeding from the same cause,neither equally to be condemn'd;for one man according to that naturall equality which is among us,permits as much to others,as he assumes to himself (which is an argument of a temperate man,and one that rightly values his power);another,supposing himselfe above others,will have a License to doe what he lists,and challenges Respect,and Honour,as due to him before others,(which is an Argument of a fiery spirit:)This mans will to hurt ariseth from Vain glory,and the false esteeme he hath of his owne strength;the other's,from the necessity of defending himselfe,his liberty,and his goods against this mans violence.

V.Furthermore,since the combate of Wits is the fiercest,the greatest discords which are,must necessarily arise from this Contention;for in this case it is not only odious to contend against,but also not to consent;for not to approve of what a man saith is no lesse then tacitely to accuse him of an Errour in that thing which he speaketh;as in very many things to dissent,is as much as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from;which may appear hence,that there are no Warres so sharply wag'd as between Sects of the same Religion,and Factions of the same Commonweale,where the Contestation is Either concerning Doctrines,or Politique Prudence.And since all the pleasure,and jollity of the mind consists in this;even to get some,with whom comparing,it may find somewhat wherein to Tryumph,and Vaunt it self;its impossible but men must declare sometimes some mutuall scorn and contempt either by Laughter,or by Words,or by Gesture,or some signe or other.then which there is no greater vexation of mind;and then from which there cannot possibly arise a greater desire to doe hurt.

VI.But the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other,ariseth hence,that many men at the same time have an Appetite to the same thing;which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common,nor yet divide it;whence it followes that the strongest must have it,and who is strongest must be decided by the Sword.

VII.Among so many dangers therefore,as the naturall lusts of men do daily threaten each other withall,to have a care of ones selfe is not a matter so scornfully to be lookt upon,as if so be there had not been a power and will left in one to have done otherwise;for every man is desirous of what is good for him,and shuns what is evill,but chiefly the chiefest of naturall evills,which is Death;and this he doth,by a certain impulsion of nature,no lesse then that whereby a Stone moves downward:It is therefore neither absurd,nor reprehensible;neither against the dictates of true reason for a man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his Body,and the Members thereof from death and sorrowes;but that which is not contrary to right reason,that all men account to be done justly,and with right;Neither by the word Right is any thing else signified,then that liberty which every man hath to make use of his naturall faculties according to right reason:Therefore the first foundation of naturall Right is this,That every man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and members.

VIII.But because it is in vaine for a man to have a Right to the end,if the Right to the necessary meanes be deny'd him;it followes,that since every man hath a Right to preserve himself,he must also be allowed a Right to use all the means,and do all the actions,without wHich He cannot Preserve himself IX.Now whether the means which he is about to use,and the action he is performing,be necessary to the preservation of his Life,and Members,or not,he Himself,by the right of nature,must be judg;for say another man,judg that it is contrary to right reason that I should judg of mine own perill:why now,because he judgeth of what concerns me,by the same reason,because we are equall by nature,will I judge also of things which doe belong to him;therefore it agrees with right reason (that is)it is the right of nature that I judge of his opinion,(i.e.)whether it conduce to my preservation,or not.

X.Nature hath given to every one a right to all.That is it was lawfull for every man in the bare state of nature,or before such time as men had engag'd themselves by any Covenants,or Bonds,to doe what hee would,and against whom he thought fit,and to possesse,use,and enjoy all what he would,or could get.

Now because whatsoever a man would,it therefore seems good to him because he wills it,and either it really doth,or at least seems to him to contribute toward his preservation,(but we have already allowed him to be judge in the foregoing Article whether it doth or not,in so much as we are to hold all for necessary whatsoever he shall esteeme so)and by the 7.Article it appeares that by the right of Nature those things may be done,and must be had,which necessarily conduce to the protection of life,and members,it followes,that in the state of nature,To have all,and do all is lawfull for all.And this is that which is meant by that common saying,Nature hath given all to all,from whence we understand likewise,that in the state of nature,Profit is the measure of Right.